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Abstract 
We examine a trade model where three countries compete for an exogenous 
number of firms. In our hub-and-spoke framework, one country is the hub 
through which all trade with and between spokes takes place. We establish the 
distribution of industrial activity in the absence of taxes and compare it to the 
equilibrium when countries compete to attract firms. Even when all countries 
are the same size, the centrality of the hub sets it apart. We determine how this 
trading pattern matters, comparing it to a structure with direct trade between 
all countries. The implications of international tax competition are also 
examined. 
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1. Introduction 
This paper examines international tax competition to attract foreign direct investment (FDI) 
in a regional model with trade costs between countries. Our innovation lies in the geography 
of the region. If there are only two countries in a region, international trade would take place 
across the common frontier of the countries.
1
 If there are three countries or more, past work 
(e.g., Haufler and Wooton, 2006) has assumed a triangular geography, where each country 
pair shares a frontier and trade between these two nations takes place across this line. But this 
excludes the possibility that, in regions composed of three or more countries, the most direct 
or cheapest route for goods traded between two nations might be through the territory of a 
third. Thus a 3-country region may be composed of one hub country and two spoke nations, 
where each spoke accesses the market of the other spoke by shipping its products through the 
hub. Clearly, this implies an asymmetry in international transport costs, apparently favouring 
the centrally placed hub. We wish to investigate how the adoption of this hub-and-spoke 
geography affects the established results for the outcome of tax competition for FDI. 
This paper was motivated by the debate regarding increased autonomy for the 
devolved administrations in the UK. There are strong political pressures to devolve corporate 
tax-setting powers to the Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland. Given the geography of the 
UK, this raises questions as to how such fiscal independence might affect the level and 
geographic distribution of economic activity and impact on the welfare of citizens.
2
 Thus the 
hub-and-spoke geographic structure we have adopted is an attempt to reflect the economic 
                                                 
1 Of course, the countries may be islands in which case a body of water separates them but there is still a 
common frontier to be crossed at some cost. 
2 The Scottish Government argues that a unified UK rate of corporate tax is neither desirable nor economically 
efficient. () Given the competitive advantages of London relative to other parts of the UK (such as Londons 
position as one of the largest financial centres in the world, and its transport links with major cities worldwide 
etc.) there is clear evidence that London (and indeed the South East of England) already has an in-built 
competitive advantage over not only Scotland but also other parts of the UK. Scotland needs the lever of 
corporate tax to consider a wider array of options than is currently the case to help address this imbalance. 
Scottish Government (2011), p34. 
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and spatial relationships within the UK and between it and the wider European market. 
However, despite the genesis of our modelling endeavour, the analysis is readily applicable to 
many situations where trade costs between countries are not symmetric. For example, North 
America is an obvious case of hub-and-spoke geography. The USA is the hub nation that 
both trades with each of the two spokes of Canada and Mexico, and it is also the conduit for 
trade between the spokes. 
At the centre of our analysis are the attempts by governments to attract inward FDI. 
FDI results in increased local production and employment within the industry concerned, and 
we assume that this local production of the good yields higher social benefits than imports. 
This reflects what seems to be a widely-held government view. There are many possible 
reasons why, independently of capital income and tax/subsidy payments, host countries may 
favour local production. In the analysis in this paper, trade between any two countries is 
costly while production costs are the same in all countries. As a result, the market price is 
lower (and consumer surplus higher) when goods are locally produced as compared to being 
imported from another country in the region. Benevolent governments will recognise this and 
seek to attract FDI.
3
  
Our starting point is Haufler and Wootons (2010) model of international competition 
to attract the FDI of firms in an oligopolistic industry.
4
 In 2-country models of this type, the 
existence of international trade costs confers an advantage on the larger country in the 
competition for firms, as a large country offers a bigger domestic market that can be served 
without trade costs. Thus size matters. We increase the number of countries to three and 
allow for different configurations of the population across the region.  
                                                 
3 Beyond this motivation, there may be labour market benefits from inward FDI. MNEs may offer wage premia 
above workers outside options, a polar case of which occurs when inward FDI relieves involuntary 
unemployment (Haaparanta, 1996 and Bjorvatn and Eckel, 2006). Alternatively, inward FDI may be associated 
with localised technological spillovers to indigenous firms (Fumagalli, 2003 and Olsen and Osmundsen, 2003). 
4 Haufler and Wooton (1999) initially consider competition for a single firm. This was extended to two firms by 
Ferrett and Wooton (2010) and to an oligopolistic industry by Haufler and Wooton (2010).   
 3 
Crucially, what further distinguishes the current analysis is our assumption that one of 
the three countries occupies a central point geographically, such that all traded goods must 
pass across its frontiers at least once. This hub country can trade directly with each of the 
other two nations but, in contrast, firms located in either spoke country can only access the 
consumers in the other peripheral spoke country by shipping their goods through the hub.
5
 
As shipping goods across national frontiers is assumed to be costly, firms located in the 
spokes are at a disadvantage in serving each others markets, as compared to those firms 
located in the hub. Consequently, we are adding centrality, in addition to size, as a 
determinant of national geographic advantage within the region.  
There are alternative interpretations or applications of the model that might shine 
some light on current policy questions. One is that the model represents a single country 
whose geography means that trade between some provinces is more expensive than others. 
Thus it could represent industrial activity in a country such as the UK, where trade between 
Scotland and Wales must take place through much-larger England. The model could then be 
used to analyse the potential for the two relatively disadvantaged provinces to use devolved 
corporate tax-setting powers to offset their geographic disadvantages. Another modelling 
possibility would be to consider a two-country setting where one of the countries is 
bicentric, having two centres of economic activity that are physically distant from one 
another. This might characterise trade within the UK (between Scotland and England) and 
between the UK and the wider European market. The implication of this is that movement of 
goods between nodes within the bicentric country will also be costly and the location of firms 
within such a country, as well as their number, will play a role. If one of this countrys nodes 
(England) is closer to the foreign market, this will be the hub through which all exports and 
                                                 
5 Haufler and Wooton (2006) have a 3-country, single-firm model of tax competition in a regional setting where 
the focus is on the implications of tax harmonisation between two of the nations. In our companion paper, 
Darby, Ferrett and Wooton (2012), we examine the outcome of tax competition between m heterogeneous 
countries but without a hub-and-spoke trading pattern. 
 4 
imports pass. The other node (Scotland) is therefore geographically disadvantaged, both by 
its smaller size and by its peripheral location, in its chances of attracting the FDI of firms 
aiming to service consumers across the entire region. This has the potential to create a tension 
between citizens resident in one node and those in the other, and may lead to calls for 
different rates of corporate taxation of firms in order to offset the locational disadvantages of 
one centre relative to the other.
6
 
Our analysis develops as follows. In section 2 we present the basic hub-and-spoke 
model and examine the geographic distribution of firms in the absence of any corporate tax 
competition. We then, in section 3, consider the non-cooperative tax equilibrium in the region 
resulting from national attempts to attract additional firms. Section 4 examines the 
importance of the trading structure by comparing it to one in which all three countries trade 
directly with one another. In Section 5, we compare the outcome of tax competition with that 
where a single regional tax authority is empowered to set the corporate taxes for all three 
countries. Finally, section 6 concludes.  
2. The baseline model 
We consider an economic region whose countries compete to attract a fixed number of firms. 
These firms produce a homogeneous good, labelled x, in an oligopolistic industry. A second 
good, the numeraire commodity z, is produced under conditions of perfect competition. The 
numeraire industry, which uses labour as its only input, is freely traded, resulting in the 
international equalisation of the wage in that industry as w. Trade costs play an important role 
in the model. It is assumed that z is freely traded while x is subject to trade costs.
7
 
                                                 
6 It is clear that many of Scotlands key exports do pass through England to access European markets. For 
example, Scottish Government (2009) reports that oil exports are piped to England (or via England to 
Continental Europe) (p46) while much of the whisky destined for European consumption is transported by 
road to cross the Channel at Dover" (p52), and in the case of fish significant road freight movement () is to 
the south of England before being transported to mainland Europe for distribution around the World(p55). 
7 Our assumption that the numeraire good is freely traded is common to much of the literature in new 
economic geography as it allows the focus to be on location and production of a particular, imperfectly 
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The region is composed of 3 countries, a hub country H, and two spoke countries S1 
and S2. The internationally immobile population is divided into households, each of which 
supplies labour effort and consumes both of the goods produced in the region. Every 
household in the region supplies a single unit of labour, and we normalise the total number of 
households across the region to 1. We allow the countries to differ in size such that there are 
n households in the hub. In order to facilitate the examination of the relative importance of 
being at the core of the region as opposed to being on the periphery, it will be useful to 
introduce symmetry across the spoke countries. Thus, we suppose that the two spokes are 
identical in size, each having a population of (1  n)/2. 
 
Figure 1. Geography of the symmetric region 
The cost of shipping a unit of good x between the hub and either spoke is equal to Ĳ. 
There is no direct trade route between the two spokes (or it is prohibitively expensive). Hence 
all shipments of good x between the two spokes must pass through the hub and, consequently, 
                                                                                                                                                        
competitive industry and isolates this discussion from issues of comparative advantage and the determination of 
relative prices. 
 6 
face a higher cost for transhipment of 2Ĳ.8 This regional trading situation is illustrated in 
Figure 1.
9
  
2.1 Consumers 
Consumers in all countries are assumed to have identical preferences for the goods, given by  
  (1) 
where i  {H, S1, S2}. The residents of the countries earn only wage income, while profit 
income accrues to capital owners who reside outside of the region. Moreover, corporate tax 
revenue, denoted by Ti, is redistributed as income in a lump-sum fashion equally to the 
households in the respective country. The budget constraint for a representative consumer in 
country i is then  
  (2) 
where pi is the relative price of good x in country i. Utility maximisation leads to 
inverse-demand curves Į  ȕxi. Aggregating the demand for good x over all consumers, yields 
market demand curves, denoted Xi:  
  (3) 
2.2 The oligopolistic industry 
There are k firms in the x industry, all of which are based outside the region.
10
 Each of these 
firms possesses one unit of knowledge capital (such as a license or patent) that can be 
profitably employed in this imperfectly competitive industry. This factor is indispensable for 
the production of good x but is limited in availability such that, at most, k firms can engage in 
                                                 
8 To keep the analysis relatively simple, we have assumed that there are no economies from long-distance 
shipping and that the cost of trade between the two spokes is the sum of the costs of each hub-to-spoke trade. 
9 In our working paper, Darby, Ferrett and Wooton (2013), we consider hub-and-spoke trade with less 
symmetry in the model. 
10 Examination of the impact of having some indigenous firms in the industry is left to future research.  
2 ,
2
  i i i iu x x zED
   i i i i
i
T
w z p x
n
( ) i ii n pX DE
 7 
production. In addition, each firm faces fixed and identical costs of setting up a production 
facility in any country. These costs are assumed to be sufficiently large to ensure that each 
firm will set up, at most, one production plant in the region. Thus each firm will serve the 
entire regional market from a single country in the region. Firms are assumed to be identical 
except with respect to the location of their production facilities. Where it locates matters to a 
firm both because of the size of its local market and the trade costs associated with its exports 
to consumers in foreign markets.
11
 
Labour is the only variable input in good x production. Each unit of good x requires 
the efforts of Ȗ workers, where Ȗ is chosen so that production of x does not exhaust each 
countrys labour supply. Given this, the marginal cost of production can be defined as 
Ȧ Ł Ȗw.12 The cost of exporting each unit of output, as detailed above, raises the marginal 
cost of serving a firms foreign markets relative to supplying domestic consumers. We are 
assuming that all of the trade costs are real, taking the form of, say, transport costs or 
administrative barriers to the free movement of goods between countries; and also that all of 
the trade costs are non-prohibitive, so that every firm serves every product market. There are 
no (endogenously determined) tariffs between the countries, as we assume that the region is a 
free-trade-area.  
Firms are assumed to behave as Cournot competitors and are able to segment their 
markets, choosing the quantities to sell on each market independently.
13
 The total operating 
profit of a firm based in each production location is therefore  
                                                 
11 The fixed cost associated with each production plant means that there are increasing returns to scale in 
production and average cost could be reduced by rationalising production with fewer plants. However, firms are 
assumed to want to protect their knowledge capital from being emulated by competitors and consequently 
choose to operate independent production facilities. 
12 Since the wage w is equalised across the countries, it does not enter the location decision of firms in our 
model. Thus the firms choice of location is not driven by labour costs. 
13 In equilibrium, firms will receive a lower producer price for their exports than for goods destined for the 
domestic market. The trade structure is simply a generalisation of the reciprocal dumping model of Brander 
and Krugman (1983). 
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  (4) 
where ʌi and xi are the pre-tax profits and home sales, respectively, of a firm based in 
country i and xji represents exports to country j by a firm based in country i. A firm is at a 
cost disadvantage in an export market as the marginal cost of exports is higher than that for 
domestic sales. Consequently we anticipate that an exporter will sell less in a market than its 
local rival.  
Suppose that of the k firms selling in country i, kH firms have their production 
facilities in the hub, while the remaining (kS Ł k  kH) firms serve the market from one of the 
two spoke nations (each hosting half of this number).
14
 Maximising (4), taking into account 
demand (3), and solving yields the total sales and price of good x in each location: 
  (5) 
In this symmetrical setting, the consumer price in the spokes is increasing in the trade cost 
and declining in the total number of firms operating in the region. This is also true of the 
price in the hub where, in addition, price is declining in the number of firms located in the 
hub, as a result of increasing local competition. Thus, as long as the hub attracts some firms, 
the price in the hub will be less than that in the spokes. Similarly, production per household 
of a firm in a spoke will be less than that of a firm in the more-competitive hub. Total output 
of the countries will further depend upon the number of households in each location.  
                                                 
14 We assume that k is sufficiently large that we can treat the numbers of firms locating in each country as 
continuous variables. Ferrett and Wooton (2010) look at k = 2, where the discrete nature of the FDI is central to 
the analysis.  
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Substituting the prices and quantities (5) into (4) yields the pre-tax profits of firms as 
a function of the location of their production facilities: 
  (6) 
where ǹ Ł Į  Ȧ. Because trade costs offer some protection from foreign rivals, profits 
accruing to firms located in any country are driven down by higher concentrations of firms in 
that location. 
We let * denote the geographic advantage of the hub relative to either spoke. This is 
defined as the difference between the total variable profits of a firm located in the hub and 
those of a firm producing in a spoke. That is, ī Ł ʌH  ʌS. 
2.3 Location in the absence of tax competition 
Suppose, initially, that firms face no corporate taxes on their earnings or that all countries 
impose the same tax on firms. In either situation, the equilibrium location of firms will be 
characterised by the pre-tax profits of all firms in the region being equalised, that is ʌH = ʌS. 
Equating the terms in (6) and solving, reveals the natural geography of the region, the 
allocation of industry that is consistent with equal pre-tax profits for all k firms. Thus ki* is 
the equilibrium number of firms that locate in country i in the absence of fiscal inducements, 
where: 
  (7) 
We can use (7) to investigate the relationship between trade costs and the sizes of 
countries in determining the degree to which industry agglomerates in particular countries. 
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We can define agglomeration as the ratio of firms in a country relative to national population. 
Thus, let Ȝi Ł ki*Úni be the number of firms per household in country i in the absence of tax 
competition.  The hub always has the advantage of centrality, in that its aggregate costs of 
serving its foreign markets are always less than those of the spoke countries, as the hub 
transports its goods directly to consumers in each spoke whereas the spokes must send all of 
their exports through the hub. This aspect of geographic advantage can be enhanced, or 
offset, by the distribution of the regions population between hub and spokes. We illustrate 
this in Figure 2, where we redistribute the population from the spokes to the hub (raising n 
and lowering nS) as we move rightwards. There is a critical level of trade cost that is 
necessary to ensure that any firms choose to locate in the spokes. Thus kS* > 0 only if 
Ĳ > 2ǹn Ú(k + 1). Below this, the firms will co-locate in the hub and service all markets from 
there. Similarly, the hub will only attract firms if trade costs are sufficiently low. Thus 
kH* > 0 only if Ĳ < 2ǹn Ú[1  k(2n í 1)]. 
 
Figure 2. Natural geography and agglomeration of industry 
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The benefit of centrality is clearly shown in Figure 2 along the vertical line at n = ѿ, 
which corresponds to each country having the same number of households.
15
 In this case, the 
number of firms per household in the hub is substantially greater than that in each of the two 
spokes. For the hub, country size reinforces centrality to the right of this vertical line where n 
rises at the expense of the population of the spokes. To the left of the vertical line, the spokes 
are allocated greater shares of the regions population than the hub, and diminishing size 
increasingly offsets centrality until the agglomeration is reversed and the spokes attract 
proportionately more of the industry. 
We now consider the role of trade costs in the natural geography of the region. In 
Figure 3 each country is the same size (n = ѿ) but the trade cost is varied. Once again, we 
focus on the agglomeration of industry by reporting the number of firms per household in 
each country. When the trade cost is low, the hubs centrality results in its attracting much 
more industry than either spoke, as the hubs easy access to the local and its export markets 
offsets the strong competition amongst firms arising from their co-location in the hub. 
However, as the trade cost between the hub and spokes increases, it becomes increasingly 
expensive for firms in the hub to sell to consumers in the spokes while those firms that are 
located in the spokes benefit from the increased market power associated with their greater 
isolation from the hub.
16
  
                                                 
15 The parameters for this and subsequent numerical simulations are: k = 100, D = 26, E = 1, Z = 1,W =0.2. 
16 If Ĳ = 0, access to domestic and foreign markets is the same and, consequently, firm location is undefined. 
See Haufler and Wooton (2010) for a discussion of the relationship between declining trade costs and increasing 
agglomeration of industry. 
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Figure 3. Natural geography and trade costs 
We can use the natural geography of industrial production to determine the level of 
economic activity in the hub and the spokes. Substituting the equilibrium allocations of 
industry (7) into (5) gives us the equilibrium output and prices in the hub and the spokes in 
the absence of tax competition: 
  (8) 
We see from (8) that trade costs impact on both the price in each national market and the 
quantity that is sold there.
17
  
                                                 
17 In Darby, Ferrett and Wooton (2013), we investigate the effects of changes in trade cost of one spoke with 
the hub while keeping the other spokes direct trade cost unchanged. 
  
 
1
, ;
2 1 1
2
, .
2 2
 $  $    
$  
S S
H H
n k
X p
k k
n
X p
n
W WZ WE
W WZE
 13 
3. Governments 
Each national government is assumed to have as its goal the maximisation of the welfare of 
its households, where welfare is the sum of the consumer surplus, tax revenue, and wage 
income. Profits do not appear in our welfare expression because we are assuming that all 
profits from the activities of the imperfectly competitive firms are repatriated to their foreign 
owners.  
  (9) 
Si is country is total consumer surplus in the market for the imperfectly competitive good, 
where 
  (10) 
given the symmetry in the model. Consumer surplus in each country is rising in the total 
number of firms in the industry, k, as this intensifies competition and reduces producer prices 
in all countries. Higher trade costs reduce consumer surplus as they reduce international 
competition. In addition, the greater the number of firms located in other countries the lower 
the consumer surplus, as consumer prices are lower when more firms produce locally. This 
gives each nation an incentive to attract firms to its home jurisdiction. 
Ti is the total corporate tax revenue collected by country i,  
  (11) 
where i  {H, S1, S2}. We assume that profits are taxed at source by the host countries of the 
firms, with ti being the lump-sum tax imposed on each firm by country i. A higher tax will 
expand the budget set of the host nations households, but will drive firms away to a lower 
tax regime. As the identical spoke countries will always choose to set the same tax as each 
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other in equilibrium, our interest lies in ¨, the difference between the tax set by the hub and 
that chosen by the spokes. Thus, let ¨ Ł tH  tS be the hub/spoke tax difference. 
The third term of national welfare is assumed to be unchanging, as wage income 
remains the same regardless of where workers are employed. We assume that the jobs 
provided by the oligopolistic industry offer the same wage as that in the numeraire industry. 
While it would be possible to include some sort of wage premium for jobs in the footloose 
industry, this would create similar incentives for attracting firms as consumer surplus, so we 
do not pursue it in this paper. 
3.1 Corporate taxation 
Firms are concerned with their after-tax earnings. Thus, they must subtract from their pre-tax 
profits (6) the lump-sum tax of the country in which they are located. In deciding upon where 
to invest, firms will compare profits net of taxes and locate in the most profitable location. If 
all countries host a strictly positive number of firms, then the locational equilibrium for the 
industry is characterised by the difference between the pre-tax profits of producing in the hub 
as compared to production in either spoke being exactly offset by the difference in the taxes 
imposed in the two types of country: 
 . (12) 
We can solve for the distribution of firms in the presence of taxes as deviations from 
the natural geography of the region (the allocation of industry in the absence of taxes). Let kit 
be country is equilibrium number of firms in the presence of taxes. From (6), (7) and (12), 
we find: 
  (13) 
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when both spokes levy the same corporate tax. It is immediately obvious that only differences 
in taxes, not the levels of taxes, matter for industrial location in the region. If all countries 
have set the same tax, firm numbers in each country are the same as in the absence of any 
corporate taxes. 
When taxes differ between hub and spokes, we can see, from the second terms of the 
equations in (13), that the hub loses firms as a result of its imposing taxes higher than those 
set in the spokes. The impact is mitigated by the (square of the) trade cost between the spoke 
and the hub. It is clear from this that the countries may have incentives to deviate from the 
tax levels of their trading partners (and, indeed, respond to any changes in taxes made by the 
other countries) in order to influence the number of firms that they attract. The task is then to 
determine what the equilibrium taxes will be in such a strategic setting. We therefore turn to 
finding the Nash taxes. 
3.2 Equilibrium taxes 
Suppose that each of the countries now sets a corporate tax to maximise its welfare, 
conditional on the taxes set by the other countries in the region. The reaction functions for the 
countries are 
 
   
     
     ^ `
   
  
 
   
 
1 2
2
2 2 2 1 2 1
,
4 3 4 3
4 1 2 1 4 5 8 1 1 4 1 8 7
.
8 1 8 11 8 1
$  ª º ¬ ¼   
    $ª º     ¬ ¼       ª º¬ ¼
H S S
Si H Sj
n k k k
t t t
k k
n k n k k n k k k n
t t t
k n k nk k n
W W W
E
W W W
E
 (14) 
Solving (14) and imposing symmetry on the spokes, yields the Nash corporate taxes tSN and 
tHN for a spoke nation and the hub, respectively: 
  (15) 
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where Ĭ Ł Ĳ ⁄ {ȕ(k + 1)2[8k + 7  4(k + 1)]} > 0.  
The tax levels in the Nash equilibrium associated with different distributions of the 
regions population and for different trade costs (Ĳ = 0.2 and Ĳ = 0.3) are illustrated in 
Figure 4. It is clear that the Nash tax charged by a country is monotonic in its relative size. 
When the hub is small and trade costs are relatively low (Ĳ = 0.2), the hub provides a subsidy 
to its firms while the spokes charge taxes; while the reverse is true when the spokes have 
relatively small shares of the population.  
 
Figure 4. Nash taxes, trade costs and country size 
Three additional aspects are worth noting. Firstly the race to the bottom is limited, as 
there is a range of the population allocation over which all countries impose taxes for both 
levels of trade cost. Secondly, in this example, the benefits of centrality depend upon the 
level of the trade cost, in that when the countries are equally sized and trade costs are low, the 
hub sets a higher tax than either spoke. However, increasing trade costs isolates national 
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markets and reduces the benefits to a firm of a central location such that the hub compensates 
by offering the lower tax in equilibrium.  
Finally, increasing the trade cost has a strong, positive impact on the levels of tax in 
both hub and spokes, but the effect is stronger for the spokes. Thus, we see in Figure 4 (for 
large n) that a higher trade cost can more-than-offset the impact of size and centrality such 
that the Nash equilibrium tax set by the spokes can exceed that of the hub. Thus efforts to 
reduce trade costs may intensify the race to the bottom in taxes and result in the spokes 
offering subsidies rather than imposing taxes and may lead, from (7), to further concentration 
of firms in the hub. Consequently, depending upon the impact on consumer surplus, transport 
infrastructure investments may have a negative impact on welfare in the region.
18
 
While messy, the expressions in (15) seem to reflect the tension facing nations 
between generating revenue from high taxes on local firms and the desire to retain domestic 
industry in order to maximise consumer surplus.
19
 Figure 5 illustrates how taxes in the Nash 
equilibrium mitigate some of the effects of natural geography where we, again, consider two 
levels of trade costs (Ĳ = 0.2 and Ĳ = 0.3). In each panel, the dashed lines indicate the number 
of firms per household captured by countries as a function of their populations in the absence 
of tax differences. We clearly see that, regardless of the level of trade cost, industry 
agglomerates in the hub as its population share increases. The solid lines show the location of 
industry when the countries set their Nash-equilibrium taxes. Even with the equilibrium taxes 
being used, the hubs centrality means that it still captures a disproportionate share of 
industry (as ȜHN > ȜSN). It is clear, however, that the distribution of firms across the region is 
less responsive to population changes when countries set their corporate taxes endogenously. 
Countries can impose taxes when their locations are attractive to firms and offer subsidies 
                                                 
18 Becker and Fuest (2010) consider the implications for tax competition and welfare of transport infrastructure 
investments in a 3-country model. 
19 If the oligopolistic industry were to bring better jobs, this latter incentive to retain domestic firms would be 
reinforced. 
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when they are geographically disadvantaged. As we saw in Figure 4, spokes will charge 
higher taxes than the hub when trade costs are high and this will reinforce the concentration 
of industry in the hub. In contrast, when trade costs are lower, which country (hub or spoke) 
offers the lower tax in equilibrium will depend upon the relative size of the hub and each 
spoke, such that a sufficiently large hub will charge a higher tax than the spokes (to the right 
of the dotted line in the left-hand panel). 
 
Figure 5. Nash taxes and location of industry 
4. The implications of centrality 
We have conducted our analysis of the location choices of firms, and the subsequent tax 
competition to influence these decisions, in a specific trading structure in which all 
international exchange must take place through a hub country. In our analysis thus far the hub 
has been distinguished from the spokes both in terms of its size and its pivotal role in trade. 
As this latter element is less well-understood, we now focus on the role that centrality has on 
our results.  
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Consider a region that exhibits triangular trade amongst three countries, as 
illustrated in Figure 6. The three countries are the same size and export directly to each other 
without transhipment through another country. We shall contrast the outcomes of firm 
location and tax competition in this setting with our hub-and-spoke results. This will enable 
us to identify the implications of preventing direct trade between the spokes and could 
provide a justification for infrastructure investment that might enable this trade to take place. 
The hub-and-spoke model can differ from the triangular model, not only in the geography of 
international trade, but also in the size of the hub relative to the spokes. In order to focus on 
how geography influences location and equilibrium taxes, we set n = ѿ so that all countries 
are the same size in both the hub-and-spoke and triangular models.
20
 
 
Figure 6. Triangular trade 
The triangular model shares the same demand and production characteristics as the 
hub-and-spoke model. Thus consumers are characterised by equations (1) through (3). All 
production locations are identical, in that their cost of exporting to either foreign market is Ĳ. 
Given this symmetry and in the absence of any corporate taxes, the equilibrium allocation of 
the k firms across the region is k⁄ 3 in each country. Consequently, not only are firms pre-tax 
profits the same across the region, prices and welfare of consumers will be identical in every 
country. Thus, we find that the equilibrium for triangular trade is characterised by: 
                                                 
20 Thus this variant of the hub-and-spoke model corresponds to Figure 6 with one of the trading links severed. 
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   (16) 
where the subscript T refers to outcomes for the triangular model.
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We wish to contrast this with the corresponding equilibrium in the hub-and-spoke 
model, that is, when each country is endowed with one third of the regions population. 
Solving (5) and (6), using the equilibrium allocation of firms (7), yields the following: 
   (17) 
We can also use (9) and (10) to determine welfare levels in the hub and spokes and, using 
(16), compare these to the welfare of citizens in the triangular region. Thus we have: 
   (18) 
where the final term in each expression is the (fixed) share of wage income received in each 
country. The implications for national welfare resulting from the relative isolation of the 
spokes compared to both the hub and nations engaged in triangular trade are illustrated in 
Figure 7. We see that welfare in a spoke is always less than that in the hub and, indeed, less 
than that of countries in the triangular model. In contrast, the relative welfare of the 
populations in the hub and in triangular countries is ambiguous, as the schedules intersect 
each other. 
                                                 
21 We do not develop this alternative model fully in this paper. We analyse a multi-country model of trade 
amongst heterogeneous nations in Darby, Ferrett and Wooton (2012). The triangular trade model is a simplified, 
special case of that structure. 
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Figure 7. National welfare and trade costs 
The comparison of outcomes turns on whether the hub receives more or less than an 
equal share of the firms in equilibrium. If we set kH* = kS* in (7) we can solve for the critical 
trade cost Ĳ* = 6ǹÚ(3k + 209). This is the trade cost, illustrated earlier in Figure 3 by the 
vertical line, where all countries in the hub-and-spoke model endogenously attract the same 
number of firms as operate in each of the triangular countries. The welfare schedules of the 
hub and triangular countries coincide at the same trade cost in Figure 7. The explanation for 
this is straightforward. Each firm is able to segment its markets, setting its price in a national 
market dependent upon the costs of serving the market and the level of competition in the 
marketplace. When a hub has one third of the population and one third of the firms, it is 
effectively identical to a triangular country and consequently the market outcomes in terms of 
sales, price and welfare are the same. At lower trade costs, firms agglomerate in the hub, 
resulting in a more competitive environment than in a triangular country. In contrast, when 
the firms are evenly distributed across the region in the hub-and-spoke model, the local firms 
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in the spokes face less competition from imports compared to those in the hub, resulting in 
lower welfare for residents of the spokes.  
4.1 Centrality and tax competition 
The differences between the trading structures is more apparent when corporate taxation is 
possible. Firms will be more footloose in the triangular model and respond more elastically 
to differences in national tax rates than in the hub-and-spoke model. This arises because no 
triangular country has a geographic advantage over any other, as they are identical in trading 
structure as well as in size. Despite their best efforts to use tax inducements to attract FDI, 
because the locations are identical to each other, the regional distribution of firms in the Nash 
equilibrium will be the same as occurs in the absence of taxes. Thus the only effect that 
international tax competition can have on welfare is its impact on the tax revenues that can be 
redistributed to households. Using (16) we find pre-tax profits of firms: 
 
   
 
2 22
2
3 2 2 1
,
9 1
$   T
k
k
W WS E   (1) 
while the lump-sum tax that is levied in the Nash equilibrium is: 
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From Error! Reference source not found., we can see that the competing national 
governments will offer the firms a subsidy to invest when trade costs are below 3ǹÚ(3k + 5). 
At all relevant trade costs, the Nash tax is less than firm profits, which could be fully 
extracted from the firms if the three governments acted cooperatively in tax setting. Thus the 
triangular model strongly exhibits a race to the bottom in corporate taxes.  
In contrast, the hub always has the benefit of centrality even when its population is the 
same as that of each of the spokes. This will have implications for the intensity of 
international tax competition and the degree to which a race to the bottom occurs. As we have 
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seen, the outcome of the international tax competition in a hub-and-spoke framework results 
in different taxes being offered by the hub and the spokes, resulting in a redistribution of 
firms relative to the equilibrium in the absence of taxes. Thus the tax competition has two 
elements: the degree to which there is a race to the bottom in order to attract the FDI; and the 
resulting location of industry. 
5. The implications of tax-setting autonomy 
In our analysis, so far, we have assumed that the countries in the region are autonomous in 
their ability to set their corporate taxes. This competition between nations has the potential to 
induce an inefficient allocation of firms across the region, as well as resulting in lower tax 
revenues through a race-to-the-bottom in taxes. 
Suppose that, instead, the region had a single tax-setting authority whose sole 
objective is to maximise the collective welfare of the three countries. In this situation, the 
problems of any race to the bottom would be eliminated. The tax authority could set taxes to 
maximise the revenues collected across the region and then these could be redistributed 
independently of where they were collected. Indeed, if the tax authority had to set a single tax 
for firms regardless of where they located in the region, the supranational agencys only 
decision would concern the level of this tax as, without differences in the taxes between the 
hub and spokes, there would be no ability on the part of the tax authority to influence the 
location of firms.
22
  
If the regional authority were able to set country-specific corporate taxes, then it has 
two instruments that influence regional production activity and, consequently, the welfare of 
residents. The tax authority can choose the tax difference (ǻ) between the hub and the spokes 
                                                 
22 In essence, this is a case of the inability to rank second-best outcomes. If countries can set their own 
corporate taxes, they will do so in the light of their own particular circumstances but the international 
competition in taxes will drive down tax revenues. In contrast, this competition can be eliminated by having a 
tax-setter for the entire region but setting a single tax for all countries will not take into account the 
hub-and-spoke trading structure. We shall now consider a first-best solution that avoids these two pitfalls. 
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to influence the locations of firms across the region, while tax levels (tH and tS where 
tH = tS + ǻ) can be used to extract the maximum profits from the industry. Having a single 
authority setting the taxes ensures that there will be no race to the bottom arising from the tax 
competition amongst rival locations.  
Regional welfare is found by summing (9) across the hub and two spokes. 
 {  W S T w  (3) 
where consumer surplus is S ŁSH + 2SS and aggregate tax revenue is T ŁtHkH + 2tSkS. From 
(10) and (13), we can find how aggregate welfare responds to changes in ǻ. Differentiating W 
with respect to ǻ and solving, yields the optimal regional tax difference ǻR: 
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where the second derivative is negative indicating a maximum. Thus regional welfare is 
maximised when firms that locate in the hub face a higher tax than those in the spokes. This 
results in more firms operating in the spokes than would arise in the absence of corporate 
taxes or when a uniform tax is set by the regional authority. Thus aggregate welfare in a 
region can be increased by the imposition of difference taxes in each of the countries, where 
the hubs geographic advantage is offset by its firms being faced with a higher tax than those 
in the spokes. The welfare-maximising allocation of firms can be found by substituting (4) 
into (13): 
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This result is illustrated in Figure 8, where aggregate welfare is plotted against the number of 
the firms in each spoke. It is clear that the regional authority also wants to have more 
production in the spokes than would arise in the Nash equilibrium (kSN).
23
 
 
Figure 8. Regional welfare and the allocation of industry 
A supranational, regional tax authority could divorce itself from the competition 
between countries, that results in similar taxes in the Nash equilibrium, and induce a 
redistribution of industry from the hub to the spokes. Having chosen the best allocation of 
industry through the difference in national taxes, the regional authority can then extract the 
firms profits by choosing the levels of national taxes that fully extract industry profits.  
Our results show that giving a supranational, regional tax authority the ability to set 
location-specific corporate taxes has important implications for the welfare of countries in the 
region. The optimal policy of encouraging more production in the spokes, relative to what 
would occur both in the absence of taxes and in the Nash equilibrium, means that households 
                                                 
23 The expressions in (5) show that prices in the spokes are higher than in the hub whenever the hub attract 
some firms. Thus, prices will only converge across the region when all industry is induced to move to the 
spokes. 
 26 
in the more-competitive hub will lose some of the advantage from its centrality as firms are  
induced to move out to the spokes.  
6. Conclusion 
In this paper we have set up a simple model of international tax competition for foreign direct 
investment. The novelty of our approach is in the geography of the supranational region 
where we have assumed that one of the countries is a hub through which all international 
trade must take place. We believe that this structure is applicable to trade amongst countries 
at the periphery of a large supranational region. Indeed, the implications of a UK government 
devolving tax-setting powers to Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland provided the initial 
motivation for this paper. 
In previous models of international tax competition for FDI, size was the only source 
of advantage in the game, resulting in larger countries setting higher corporate taxes. Now 
centrality also plays a role, giving firms in the hub easier access to foreign markets than 
enjoyed by firms located in the spokes. Depending on the relative sizes of the countries 
within the supranational region and the costs of trading between nations, size and centrality 
may work together or in opposition to each other to result in agglomeration of 
disproportionate shares of industry in either the hub or the spokes. 
We determined the equilibrium outcomes of our hub-and-spoke trading structure with 
respect to the location of industry and the levels of corporate taxation. We have established 
that in this hub-and-spoke framework the race to the bottom is limited in that we can find 
equilibrium outcomes in which all countries impose taxes. Moreover, the central position of 
the hub is important in that, if countries are equally sized and trade costs are low, the hub will 
set a higher tax than either spoke. The trade cost has a strong positive impact on the levels of 
tax in both hub and spokes and efforts to reduce trade costs may result in lower taxes and 
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more concentration of firms in the hub. Consequently, transport infrastructure investments 
may have a negative impact on the region overall. 
In the hub-and-spoke framework, firms are less footloose than they would be in the 
equivalent trading system where all countries can trade directly with each other. In such a 
triangular model, firms respond more elastically to differences in national tax rates than in the 
hub-and-spoke model. This is because no triangular country has a geographic advantage 
comparable to that enjoyed by the hub. The Nash equilibrium in a triangular model with 
identical countries is characterised by a race to the bottom with identical taxes set by all 
nations and consequently the same distribution of firms as occurs in the absence of taxes. 
Finally, we have considered how the outcome in the hub-and-spoke model would 
change if tax-setting powers were transferred from individual countries to a supranational, 
regional tax authority. The authority would be immune to the pressures of the race to the 
bottom resulting from international competition between hub and spokes. It could, however, 
create a difference in national taxes in order overcome firms reluctance to produce in the 
more isolated spokes. While this policy would raise aggregate welfare, the citizens in the hub 
would be adversely affected from having fewer local producers.  
These outcomes provides a justification for the calls for different corporate tax rates 
across a geographically diverse state, such as the UK, in order to offset the disadvantages 
faced by producers locating on the periphery of the economic area, as compared to those that 
chose a more metropolitan location. But rather than doing this at the cost of the intraregional 
rivalry that would arise if the tax setting powers were devolved, the superior outcome would 
be for the supranational tax authority to take into account the different circumstances facing 
central and peripheral countries within the region and set different taxes for each. 
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